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Americans work more than Europeans. Using micro-data from the United States and 17
European countries, we document that women are typically the largest contributors to the
cross-country differences in work hours. We also show that there is a negative relation
between taxes and annual hours worked, driven by men, and a positive relation between
divorce rates and annual hours worked, driven by women. In a calibrated life-cycle model
with heterogeneous agents, marriage and divorce, we find that the divorce and tax
mechanisms together can explain 45% of the variation in labor supply between the United
States and the European countries.
& 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
It is a well-known empirical finding that aggregate hours worked are higher in the United States than in Europe and that
there is also substantial variation among European countries; see for instance Prescott (2004) and Rogerson (2006). These
differences deserve attention: Rogerson (2006) notes that they are an order of magnitude larger than the fluctuations at
business cycle frequencies in post-WWII U.S. data. Are the differences in hours worked due to public policies or are they due
to other fundamental differences between societies?
This paper has two contributions: first, it documents, using cross-country data, that there is a negative relation between
taxes and annual hours worked and a positive relation between divorce rate and annual hours worked. While the first
relation is well-known, the second one is new, at least from a cross-country perspective. Furthermore, this paper shows that
the negative relation between taxes and hours is driven by the behavior of men (i.e. for women the correlation between
taxes and hours is close to zero) and the positive relation between divorce and hours is driven by the behavior of women
(i.e. for men the correlation between divorce and hours is close to zero).
Second, motivated by these two facts, this paper builds a life cycle model economy populated by heterogenous agents in
which both taxes and marital instability affect hours of work. In the model economy, the marital transitions are exogenous,
but given these exogenous transitions agents adjust their labor supply and savings behavior. An important assumption is
that the labor force participation is associated with higher future earnings, as agents accumulate experience. The model is75275-0333, United States. Tel.: þ1 312 208 1283.
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rates can account for cross-country differences in hours worked. To this end, we use the calibrated economy and change
taxes and/or marriage and divorce rates. The results show that taxes play an important role for differences in male hours,
while differences in marriage and divorce explain differences in female hours.
We begin by using micro-level data to document the contribution of various demographic groups to the aggregate
differences in hours worked between the U.S. and 17 European countries (Western Europe, except Iceland and Lichtenstein).
We divide the populations into 12 demographic groups, by age, gender and marital status, and find that the largest
contribution comes from prime-aged women. In most European countries, women work substantially less than in the
United States while the difference in hours worked between European and American men is smaller.1 This is especially true
for married women, but also holds for single women, and for women with and without children. Next, we document the
main motivation for this paper: a negative cross-country correlation between tax levels and hours worked, and a positive
correlation between divorce rates and hours worked across countries. However, taxes are in particular correlated with male
work hours, while divorce rates are in particular correlated with female work hours.
Why should divorce rates affect labor supply? The value of marriage as consumption insurance has been pointed out in
the literature.2 This paper argues that a higher probability of divorce affects labor supply by reducing the expected value of
insurance provided by marriage. In response, individuals self-insure by investing in experience accumulation in the labor
market. The argument also applies to individuals who have not yet married. Thus, differences in divorce rates can help
explain cross-country differences in labor supply.
To quantitatively assess the impact of taxes and marriage stability on labor supply, we develop a life-cycle, overlapping-
generations model with heterogeneous agents, marriage and divorce. There are three types of households: single men,
single women and married couples. Divorces and marriages occur stochastically.3 We calibrate our model to U.S. data and
study how labor supply in the U.S. changes as we introduce divorce and marriage probabilities and tax systems from other
countries. We find that making marriages more stable results in a reduction of labor supply, particularly for women. This is
because women are usually the second earners in a married couple. The insurance effect of marriage is therefore stronger
for women, and female labor supply is more sensitive to divorce and marriage rates.
When treated with both divorce and marriage probabilities and tax systems from the European countries at the same
time, the model can explain 45% of the variation in aggregate labor supply between the U.S. and the European countries.
Changing only the probabilities of marriage and divorce in the U.S. to their European equivalents accounts for 17% of the
cross-country differences in aggregate hours worked. When we only introduce European taxes, we can account for 32% of
the variation in aggregate hours worked between the U.S. and the European countries. For female labor supply, marriage
stability explains 22% of the variation in work hours. However, taxes are unable to explain any variation in female labor
supply. Taxes are on the other hand very good predictors of male labor supply. For men, taxes explain 71% of the variation
between the U.S. and the 17 European countries compared to 9% explained by divorce and marriage rates. In Section 6 we
relate the differential impact of taxation on male and female labor supply to the fact that countries with high tax average
levels also tend to have progressive taxes and separate taxation of married couples.
There is a substantial literature devoted to the rise in female work hours in the US over time. The same explanations may be
important from a cross country perspective. Divorce rates have been shown to have a significant effect on female labor supply
(see Johnson and Skinner, 1986; Stevenson, 2008). In a contemporary paper which is closely related to ours, Fernández and
Wong (2013) find that divorce rates can help explain the rise in female labor force participation over time in the U.S. Building a
life-cycle model and treating it with exogenous divorce and marriage rates the authors can explain a significant fraction of the
increase in labor force participation of married women in the 1955 cohort compared to the 1935 cohort. The rest is explained by
changes in wage structure. Kaygusuz (2010) finds that 20–24% of the 13% points rise in labor force participation of U.S. married
women between 1980 and 1990 can be explained by changes in taxes. In another related contemporary paper by Guvenen and
Rendall (2013), women can achieve insurance against a bad marriage through education. Guvenen and Rendall (2013) are able
to explain the rise in divorce and decline in marriage rates in U.S. using their framework. Attanasio et al. (2008) look at the life-
cycle labor supply of American women born in the 1930s, 1940s and 1950s and find that a combination of a reduction in the
cost of children alongside a reduction in the wage-gender gap is needed to explain the increase in participation of the youngest
cohort. Jones et al. (2003) study the increase in labor supply of married women in U.S. between 1950 and 1990 and find that the
gender wage gap plays an important role, while technological improvements in the household have limited impact on the
increase in labor supply by married women. On the other hand, Greenwood et al. (2005) find that new household technologies
can help explain the rise in married female labor force participation. Fernández et al. (2004) argue that changes in
characteristics of men –whose mothers have worked themselves – help explain the labor participation decisions of their wives.1 The Nordic countries are an exception.
2 See for instance Kotlikoff and Spivak (1981) who study the gains from marriage due to risk sharing. Johnson and Skinner (1986) and Stevenson (2008)
have shown that divorce rates have significant effects on female labor supply.
3 Two recent papers also making the assumption of exogenous divorce and marriage rates are Cubeddu and Rios-Rull (2003) and Fernández and Wong
(2013). This is reasonable because literature has shown that cultural, legal and birth control factors play an important role for cross-country differences in
divorce and marriage rates (See Johnson and Skinner, 1986; Goldin and Katz, 2002; Crouch and Beaulieu, 2006; Stevenson, 2008; McDermott et al., 2009;
Gonzalez and Viitanen, 2009; Furtado et al., 2010; Kennes and Knowles, 2012 among others).
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supply across countries, is Bick and Fuchs-Schundeln (2014). Using a static model with two-person households, they
concentrate on the labor supply of married couples. The authors find that introducing European tax systems into their
model, which is calibrated to the U.S., does well in explaining cross country differences in male work hours. For countries
which, similar to the U.S., practice joint taxation of married couples,4 taxes also help explaining differences in female work
hours. For countries who practice a higher degree of separate taxation of married couples, taxes explain less of the
differences in female labor supply. The reason is that some of the countries with relatively high average tax rate practice
separate taxation and in addition have very progressive tax schedules. The tax rate on the secondary earner (usually the
female) is therefore not necessarily that different from the U.S. This is similar to what we find in Section 6.3.
Other mechanisms that may affect differences in work hours across countries have also been investigated in the
literature. In particular, Rendall (2011) investigates differential productivity across sectors, Alesina et al. (2005) suggest
regulations and unionization, Wallenius (2012) considers social security systems and resulting redistributive effects and
Olivetti (2006) looks at the role of returns to experience. We partially capture the redistributive effects in our model, but due
to data limitations are unable to capture country specific gender wage gaps, returns to labor market experience, and
unionization effects. These mechanisms could also contribute to explaining cross-country differences in work hours. While
we do not expect that our two mechanisms can explain all of the cross-country variation in hours, in Section 6 we find that
they explain a substantial fraction (45%).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: in Section 2, we study the contributions of different demographic groups
to aggregate differences in labor supply between the U.S. and 17 Western European countries. In Section 3, we document a
correlation between aggregate labor supply and taxation across countries and a correlation between aggregate labor supply and
divorce rates across geographic regions. Section 4 develops the quantitative model. Section 5 discusses data and calibration.
Section 6 studies the quantitative implications of changing the U.S. divorce and marriage probabilities to their European
counterparts, and quantitative implications of introducing European tax schemes in the U.S. Section 7 concludes.
2. Labor supply in the U.S. and Europe
This section analyzes the data for the annual hours worked in the U.S. and Europe.
2.1. Data description
To obtain information about annual hours worked, we use two sources of micro-data – the European Union Labor Force
Survey database (E.U. LFS), which contains data from the 17 European countries in our sample, and the Current Population
Survey (CPS), which contains the corresponding data from the U.S. Both of these datasets are used by the OECD to construct
their macro-level labor market statistics. We use data from 2000 for all countries except Germany, for which E.U. LFS data is
only available from 2002.
Similar to Prescott (2004), we consider individuals between 15 and 64 years of age. We construct the data on annual
hours worked as the product of hours worked per week and the number of weeks worked per year. We provide further
details and discuss some existing issues with the data in Appendix A.5
2.2. Labor supply across countries
Column (2) in Table 1 shows that when taking a simple average across all European countries in our sample, in the year
2000 European hours worked were 81.70% of (or about 249 hours less than) those in the U.S. At the same time, there is a
substantial variation within Europe. The annual hours worked in Switzerland were quite close to those in the U.S., while in
Belgium they were only 69.18% of (or more than 400 h lower than) those in the U.S.
Columns (3) and (4) in Table 1 show cross-country differences in hours worked for men and women separately. On
average, the difference for women is about 45% larger than for men. However, the average masks a large variation within
Europe. We divide the European countries in our sample in three subgroups: Nordic countries, Central Europe and Southern
Europe.6 In the Nordic countries, the difference from the U.S. is in fact larger for men, while in a typical Southern European
country (with the only exception of Portugal), the difference for women is about two to three times larger than the
corresponding difference for men.
Columns (5)–(8) in Table 1 compare the average annual hours worked by marital status. Among the four gender/marital
status groups shown in the table (married men, single men, married women and single women), married women in Europe
display the largest difference from their U.S. counterparts. However, this is largely due to the behavior of married women in
Central and Southern European countries. In Nordic countries, married women work almost as many hours as those in the4 Germany and Belgium would be examples of such countries.
5 Internet supplement is available at http://ees.elsevier.com/monec/download.aspx?id=80486&guid=f0c00206-bc0b-408b-a050-eac8f9f521bc&
scheme=1.
6 We put Ireland in the “Southern” European group, since it resembles those countries along two important dimensions: marriage stability and labor
supply of women. It might be more appropriate to call this group of countries “Catholic”.
Table 1
Annual hours worked, all persons 15–64 years of age. Hours worked per year for the U.S., percent of the U.S. for other countries.
Country: All Men Women Men,
married
Women,
married
Men,
single
Women,
single
Men,
15–
24 yr
Women,
15–24 yr
Men,
25–
54 yr
Women,
25–54 yr
Men,
55–
64 yr
Women,
55–64 yr
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
Nordic countries:
Denmark 88.80 87.95 91.98 81.10 92.90 107.00 88.30 136.10 121.80 82.40 88.60 77.80 72.20
Finland 86.92 83.33 91.45 80.90 98.50 97.40 83.40 108.40 98.20 85.10 95.50 56.40 70.10
Norway 83.32 84.86 79.96 81.90 81.90 98.80 76.50 108.70 93.50 79.70 77.00 90.70 82.90
Sweden 89.72 86.18 93.99 83.40 99.50 104.20 88.40 89.30 87.80 84.40 92.80 87.20 100.70
Group mean: 87.19 85.58 89.34 81.83 93.20 101.85 84.15 110.62 100.33 82.90 88.48 78.02 81.48
Central Europe:
Austria 83.24 88.76 75.38 80.00 66.40 107.30 86.50 136.30 129.60 90.20 78.00 56.00 30.80
Belgium 69.18 74.89 60.96 71.80 59.00 81.10 61.80 69.80 62.20 80.20 68.30 42.80 20.70
France 72.18 74.98 68.22 74.10 69.40 81.60 65.50 68.10 57.60 81.10 74.50 42.70 39.40
Germany 71.00 74.68 64.93 69.50 55.70 86.40 76.90 96.90 104.40 75.10 66.30 57.60 38.80
Luxembourg 76.60 85.96 62.07 82.50 55.60 86.40 72.50 76.40 66.00 92.30 66.20 50.60 27.30
Netherlands 76.01 88.19 57.81 81.80 47.80 99.60 72.90 105.90 102.50 87.40 55.70 63.60 27.10
Switzerland 97.24 107.68 84.89 98.00 60.10 130.50 113.20 141.40 161.40 98.70 79.30 109.20 66.90
UK 90.17 97.47 80.85 92.60 76.30 110.10 84.80 126.10 122.30 95.50 79.70 85.50 55.60
Group mean: 79.45 86.58 69.39 81.29 61.29 97.88 79.26 102.61 100.75 87.56 71.00 63.50 38.33
South Europe:
Greece 87.09 98.35 71.73 95.70 72.10 100.60 67.20 99.10 76.20 100.80 76.60 92.40 55.00
Ireland 82.17 92.35 66.55 92.10 55.80 101.80 77.70 121.70 105.70 92.40 66.40 94.40 39.90
Italy 73.70 84.54 58.37 82.50 54.70 87.60 62.20 78.70 63.10 89.30 63.50 60.10 29.70
Portugal 88.57 90.62 85.60 87.70 89.10 91.80 74.70 123.50 98.60 90.80 91.20 88.50 69.30
Spain 73.04 83.45 58.00 83.60 52.60 85.30 64.10 95.30 72.40 85.30 61.40 78.50 36.50
Group mean: 80.91 89.86 68.05 88.32 64.86 93.42 69.18 103.66 83.20 91.72 71.82 82.78 46.08
Overall
mean:
81.70 87.31 73.69 83.48 69.85 97.50 77.45 104.81 95.49 87.69 75.35 72.59 50.76
United
States
1360.40 1613.00 1121.30 1931.70 1171.90 1191.30 1087.50 714.30 574.30 1951.90 1332.00 1354.80 894.80
Note: This table reports the annual hours worked by each group as a fraction of the respective U.S. group in the year 2000. Column (2) shows the average
annual hours worked per European country in our sample. Columns (3) and (4) show cross-country differences in hours worked for men and women
separately. We divide the European countries in our sample in 3 subgroups: Nordic countries, Central Europe and Southern Europe. Columns (5)–(8)
compare the average annual hours worked by marital status. Columns (9)–(14) compare the cross-country differences in hours worked by gender and 3 age
groups: (i) “young” (16–24 years of age), (ii) “prime-aged” (25–54 years of age) and (iii) “old” (55–64 years of age). Column (2) shows that the average work
hours in Europe are 81.70% of (or about 249 hours less than) those in the U.S. Columns (3) and (4) show that the difference in work hours for women is
about 45% larger than for men. There is large variation within Europe. The difference in work hours is driven by Southern European women, where the
difference for women is about two to three times larger than the corresponding difference for men. Columns (5)–(8) show that married women in Central
and Southern Europe display the largest difference from their U.S. counterparts. Columns (9)–(14) show that among the three age groups, the largest
difference is displayed by the “old” European men and women. However, due to the relative sizes of the age groups, prime-aged persons (and in particular
prime-aged women) are typically the largest contributors to the aggregate difference with the U.S.
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particularly large in Southern Europe.
We use legal marital status in our analysis. Cohabitation is an important issue. However, data is mostly unavailable
regarding cohabiting couples. Eurostat database that we use to compute the marriage and divorce probabilities provides
data on persons in registered partnership for only four countries in our sample: the Netherlands, Denmark, Finland and
Sweden, starting from 2007. In Appendix B, we discuss the impact of cohabitation on these four countries in some detail.
The impact of cohabitation for the four countries seems limited. However, more research using more data is necessary
before a conclusion can be reached. At the same time, we believe that people that are legally married and those that only
cohabit differ along the dimensions (such as separation costs and tax schedule) that are mainly relevant for this paper. The
existing research on this matter appears to support this view (see, for example, Gemici and Laufer, 2010).7
Columns (9)–(14) in Table 1 contrasts the cross-country differences in hours worked by gender and three age groups: (i)
“young” (16–24 years of age), (ii) “prime-aged” (25–54 years of age) and (iii) “old” (55–64 years of age). As before, for each
age group, the difference is larger for women. Among the three age groups, the largest difference from the corresponding
reference group in the U.S. on average is displayed by the “old” European men and women. However, as we will discuss later,
because of the relative sizes of the age groups, prime-aged persons (and in particular prime-aged women) are typically the
largest contributors to the aggregate difference with the U.S.7 In a few European countries, cohabitation is quite similar to marriage (see Perelli-Harris and Gassen, 2012).
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is natural to ask whether this is related to women reducing their labor supply as a result of having children.
Panel A of Table H.14 in the Appendix shows that when we concentrate on a narrower age group (20–30 years of age), we
find that these younger womenwithout small children in Europe typically have annual hours of work that are closer to their
American counterparts. This is in comparison to the same group of young women with small children, where we find a
larger gap in work hours. This pattern is especially true for countries like Austria and Germany. Comparing Columns (2) and
(4) for those two nations shows that numbers drop from 100.3% and 82.9% of U.S. hours to 57.1% and 37.2% of the U.S. hours
for Austria and Germany respectively.8
Next, we investigate the contribution of women with small children to the overall difference in annual hours worked,
with respect to U.S. Panel B of Table H.14 in the Appendix shows that the contribution of women with small children to the
overall difference in annual hours worked, with respect to the U.S., is typically substantially smaller than the contribution of
women without small children. This is intuitive because the annual hours worked by women with small children is
generally lower than other groups in both U.S. and Europe, and this group is not very large. Hence, the explanatory power of
the difference in annual hours worked by womenwith small children is itself low. This is the reasonwhy while children may
play an important role in labor supply of young women, the presence of children does not play such a significant role in the
difference of labor supply between U.S. and Europe. Bick and Fuchs-Schundeln (2014) also do not find that women with
small children are a major contributor to the difference in labor supply between U.S. and European countries. However,
more research needs to be done on this important sub-group of population.2.3. Group contribution decomposition
To analyze the contributions of various demographic groups to the difference between aggregate labor supply in the U.S.
and the European countries in our sample, we perform the following decomposition. Suppose we divide each country's
sample into n different groups. Then the difference between the aggregate average annual hours worked in the U.S., h
us
, and
in country j, h
j
, can be written as
h
ushj ¼
Xn
i ¼ 1
ωusi h
us
i 
Xn
i ¼ 1
ωjih
j
i ¼
Xn
i ¼ 1
ðhusi hjiÞωusi
|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
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“compositional effect”
ð1Þ
where ωi
j
is the share of observations that come from group i in country j's sample, while hi
j
is the average annual hours
worked by individuals in this group.9 The last term in Eq. (1), which we call the “compositional” effect, reflects the
differences in hours worked due to the differences in the composition of the population in the two countries. For instance, a
positive compositional effect would mean that in the U.S., the demographic groups that typically work more (such as prime-
aged men) have relatively larger size, and the demographic groups that typically work less (such as older women) have
smaller size compared to the corresponding European country j. We are more interested in the first term which we call the
“behavioral effect”. It captures the differences in hours worked by various demographic groups in the two countries,
assuming that the composition of the population in these two countries is the same.
We divide the data into 12 demographic groups, according to gender, marital status and age (using three age groups).
Table 2 reports the contribution of various demographic groups to the difference in aggregate labor supply. Columns (2) and
(3) divide the population by gender, and add up to one. Columns (4)–(6) divide the population by age, i.e. Young, Prime-aged
and Old, and add up to one as well. As can be seen from Column (7) in Table 2, the compositional effect is typically small. On
average, it accounts for 6.6% of the difference between the U.S. and the European countries in our dataset. The rest of the
difference is due to the behavioral effect. Columns (8) and (9) report the intensive and extensive margins, and add up to one.
Columns (2)–(6) in Table 2 show the contribution of several demographic groups of interest to the behavioral effect
(while Table H.11 in the Appendix provides more details). To compute the weighted means for the three subgroups, and for
all European countries in our sample, we weight them according to the size of the difference from the U.S.10 The table shows
that in Central and especially in Southern Europe, women are the main contributors to the differences in hours worked
between the U.S. and the European countries. In particular, the biggest contribution in these two groups of countries is
coming from married prime-aged women. In contrast to this, in the Nordic countries, the biggest contribution comes from
married prime-aged men.
As we mentioned earlier, the largest difference in terms of hours worked per person is displayed by older persons.
However, because of the small size of that demographic group, their contribution to the overall difference is much smaller
than the contribution of the prime-aged individuals.8 Table H.14 contains only a subset of countries for which E.U. LFS provide information on children.
9 This is similar to the decomposition performed in Blundell et al. (2011). They analyze the changes in hours worked over time, while we look at the
differences in hours worked between countries at a given point in time.
10 We use the weights ωi ¼ΔU:S., i=
P
iΔU:S., i . One feature of such a weighting scheme is that it puts lower weight on Switzerland, which appears to be a
special case. The difference between the U.S. and Switzerland is very small to begin with and therefore a relatively small absolute difference for one
demographic group can be a large percentage difference.
Table 2
Contribution of demographic groups to overall difference in annual hours worked, with respect to the U.S.
Country Men Women Young Prime-aged Old Composition Intensive margin Extensive margin
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Nordic countries
Denmark 62.3 37.7 31.4 105.9 25.5 8.9 124.0 24.0
Finland 73.6 26.4 6.7 69.5 37.2 18.8 35.4 64.6
Norway 49.1 50.9 2.1 94.8 7.3 3.9 124.4 24.4
Sweden 73.0 27.0 7.9 85.2 6.9 6.9 102.7 2.7
Central Europe
Austria 36.6 63.4 24.7 82.6 42.1 17.0 57.8 42.2
Belgium 47.7 52.3 9.4 66.5 24.1 4.4 51.4 48.6
Netherlands 30.9 69.1 3.0 80.6 22.4 4.0 91.0 9.0
Germany 50.3 49.7 0.7 81.1 19.6 5.4 68.2 31.8
Switzerland 74.8 174.8 138.6 211.4 27.3 40.2 34.4 65.6
France 50.8 49.2 11.5 64.7 23.8 5.3 48.0 52.0
Luxembourg 36.4 63.6 10.0 61.3 28.7 8.0 40.5 59.5
UK 12.1 87.9 30.6 98.0 32.5 9.1 75.3 24.7
Southern Europe
Greece 0.4 99.6 5.0 67.6 27.4 22.5 120.2 220.2
Ireland 15.0 85.0 10.8 91.9 19.0 11.8 35.7 64.3
Italy 33.9 66.1 9.9 67.2 22.9 6.0 5.2 105.2
Portugal 52.7 47.3 17.7 90.5 27.2 26.3 33.8 66.2
Spain 33.6 66.4 3.8 79.0 17.2 9.8 21.2 78.8
R2 – – – – – – 0.138 0.423
Mean: 34.3 65.7 12.3 88.1 24.2 6.6 63.3 36.7
Mean (weighted): 39.7 60.3 2.3 78.8 23.5 7.6 49.6 50.4
Mean (Nordic): 63.0 37.0 7.7 88.9 18.8 6.9 97.3 2.7
Mean (Central): 39.3 60.7 2.1 76.0 26.1 4.8 64.1 35.9
Mean (South): 28.0 72.0 0.3 78.0 21.7 12.8 5.7 105.7
Note: This table reports the contributions of various demographic groups to the difference between aggregate labor supply in the U.S. and the European
countries in our sample. Each column captures the differences in hours worked by various demographic groups in the two countries, assuming that the
composition of the population in these two countries is the same. The data is divided into 12 demographic groups, according to gender, marital status and
age (using three age groups). Columns (2) and (3) divide the population by gender, and add up to one. Columns (4)–(6) divide the population by age, i.e.
Young, Prime-aged and Old, and add up to one as well. Column (7) reports the compositional effect, i.e. the differences in hours worked due to the
differences in the composition of the population in the two countries. This is typically small, and on average, accounts for 6.6% of the difference between
the U.S. and the European countries in our dataset. Columns (8) and (9) report the intensive and extensive margins, and add up to one. The table shows that
in Central and Southern Europe, women – specifically married prime-aged women – are the main contributors to the differences in hours worked between
the U.S. and the European countries. Older persons' contribution to the overall difference is much smaller than the contribution of the prime-aged
individuals due to the smaller size of group.
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In this subsection we investigate whether the discrepancies in work hours between the U.S. and Europe are due to
Americans working longer hours (intensive margin) or whether they are due to more Americans working (extensive
margin). We find that the two margins are about equally important.
The two last columns of Table 2 show the contribution of the intensive and extensive margins to the difference in labor
supply between the U.S. and country i, using the following decomposition formula:
h
U:S:hi ¼HU:S:empl  ShareU:S:emplHiempl  Shareiempl
¼ HU:S:emplHiempl
 
ShareU:S:empl|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
Intensive Margin
þðShareU:S:emplShareiemplÞHiempl|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
Extensive Margin
ð2Þ
From the OECD data, one can compute the total average hours worked in country i, Hi, as the product of the hours worked by
employed persons, Hiempl, and the share of the population which is employed, Share
i
empl. Table 2 reports the contributions of
intensive and extensive margins as a percentage of the total difference in hours worked between the U.S. and country i,
h
U:S:hi. As can be seen from the table, both margins appear to be important. The contribution of the extensive margin is
particularly large in Southern Europe, while the intensive margin is more important in the Nordic countries, Netherlands
and Germany (with Switzerland being a special case).
3. Possible determinants of labor supply: taxes and marriage stability
Taxes have been suggested as a major contributor to cross country differences in labor supply in the literature (see
Prescott, 2004; Rogerson, 2006). Marriage stability is a new explanation in this context, motivated by our finding in Section 2
I. Chakraborty et al. / Journal of Monetary Economics 72 (2015) 1–20 7that women are the biggest contributor to the cross-country differences in labor supply. Our hypothesis is that more stable
marriages provide consumption insurance, thereby reducing the incentives to accumulate labor market experience, in
particular for women who often are secondary earners. Conversely, a higher probability of divorce can increase the value of
market experience for the woman who has a higher probability of ending up as a single earner.
It is well-known that the level of labor income taxes is higher in Europe (see Prescott, 2004). However, there are many
issues to consider when comparing labor income taxes across countries. Both the cross-country differences in tax levels and
tax progressivity may be of interest. We use three measures that capture some elements of the cross-country differences in
tax progressivity: (1) top marginal tax rates, (2) progressivity wedge (PW) measure from Guvenen et al. (2014):11
PW y1; y2
 ¼ 11τðy2Þ
1τðy1Þ
ð3Þ
This intuitive measure, where a higher value indicates a more progressive tax schedule, takes values between 0 and 1 but
will naturally be sensitive to the choice of y1 and y2, except with flat taxes. If there is a flat tax, then the progressivity wedge
would be zero for all levels of y1 and y2. Table H.10 in the Appendix shows that according to this measure, among the 18
countries in the table, Denmark has the most progressive taxes and Switzerland the least progressive. The U.S. is among the
countries with the least progressive taxes, while Germany is among the countries with the most progressive taxes.
Consumption taxes may also have an impact on labor supply decisions, since it affects the purchasing power of the after-
tax income the worker receives. The consumption tax varies from a low 7.6% in Switzerland, to a high 25% in Denmark and
Sweden. The U.S. has the second lowest consumption tax among the countries in our dataset. To capture the joint effect of
labor and consumption taxes, we consider the effective tax rate on labor income, τ, as defined in Prescott (2004) is
τ¼ 1ð1τlÞ=ð1þτcÞ, which is the fraction of labor income that is taken by the government in the form of labor and
consumption taxes.
Table 3 shows the results of regressing (the log of) average annual hours of work on the number of divorces per 1000
married people and each of our tax measures.12 In Columns (3) and (4), we find that both the divorce rate and the average
tax rate/average effective tax rate are highly statistically significant, and have the expected sign – higher taxes tend to
reduce average hours worked, while higher number of divorces tends to increase them.
Fig. 1 shows that the taxes and divorces affect men and women differently. While there is a strong positive correlation
between the divorce rates and hours worked for women, the corresponding correlation for men is positive but close to zero.
On the other hand, while there is a strong negative correlation between the hours worked and the average effective tax rate
for men, the corresponding correlation for women is also negative but close to zero.
This is further confirmed in Panel B of Table 3 where we regress (the logarithm of) hours worked on divorce rate and
average effective tax rate for men and women separately.
4. Model
The stationary economy is populated by three types of households: single males, single females, and married couples.
Individuals start their work life at age 20. They live for at least 65 years and at most 95 years, but enter retirement at age 65.
A model period is 1 year, so there are a total of 45 model periods of active work life. In addition to demographics, households
are heterogeneous with respect to asset holdings, years of labor market experience, and idiosyncratic productivity shocks
(market luck). Single households face an age-dependent probability of becoming married, while married couples face an
age-dependent probability of divorce. One is more likely to be married to someone with a similar level of education. We
assume that marriage will always happen to a partner of the same age, and that married couples die together. Households
decide whether or not to participate in the labor market, how many hours to work conditional on participation, how much
to consume, and how much to save. If they participate in the labor market, they accumulate one year of labor market
experience.
4.1. Labor income
Individuals choose work hours, nA ½0;1. The wage per time unit, w, of an individual depends on his level of education,
jAfhs; cg (where “hs” stands for high school and “c” stands for college), gender, gAfm; fg, years of labor market experience,
x, and idiosyncratic productivity shock, u:
wðj; g; x;uÞ ¼ eγ0jg þγ1jgxþ γ2jgx2 þγ3jgx3 þu ð4Þ
u0 ¼ ρjguþϵ; ϵNð0;σ2jgÞ ð5Þ
Given this wage function, the beginning wage level as well as the returns to experience and idiosyncratic shock process are
allowed to differ by level of education and gender. The productivity shock is assumed to follow the AR(1)-process in Eq. (5).11 An analogous measure is used in Caucutt et al. (2003).
12 We provide the details of how we construct these divorce rates in the calibration section below.
Table 3
Relation between average hours worked, divorce rates and tax measures.
Panel A: Hours for both genders
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Divorce rate 0.026n 0.023n 0.039nnn 0.038nnn
(0.013) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011)
Top marginal tax rate 0.004 – – –
(0.004)
Progressivity wedge – 0.622 – –
(0.432)
Average labor income
tax
– – 0.869nnn –
(0.287)
Average effective tax rate – – – 0.913nnn
(0.264)
Const 7.117nnn 7.057nnn 7.113nnn 7.223nnn
(0.189) (0.113) (0.081) (0.099)
Adjusted R2 0.142 0.184 0.423 0.484
Panel B: Average hours by gender
Men Women
Divorce rate 0.019n 0.070nnn
(0.009) (0.019)
Average effective tax rate 1.055nnn 0.710
(0.229) (0.474)
Const 7.595nnn 6.705nnn
(0.086) (0.179)
Adjusted R2 0.533 0.403
Note: Panel A reports the results of regressing logarithm of average hours
worked in each country in the dataset on a number of divorces per 1000
married persons and each tax measure for both genders together. Panel B
reports the results of regressing logarithm of average hours worked on
divorce rates and average effective tax rate by gender. Panel A Columns (3)
and (4) show that both the divorce rate and the average tax rate/average
effective tax rate are highly statistically significant, and have the expected
sign – higher taxes tend to reduce average hours worked, while higher
number of divorces tends to increase them. Panel B shows that for women,
the divorce rates are statistically significant and have three times larger
magnitude than for men. The average effective tax rates are highly
statistically significant for men, but not for women.
Standard errors are in parentheses. Stars denote statistical significance
(nnnpo0.01, nnpo0.05, and npo0.10, respectively).
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The momentary utility function of single individuals, US, depends on work hours, nA ½0;1, consumption, c, and gender, g:
US g; c;nð Þ ¼ log cð Þχg
n1þηg
1þηg
Fg1 n40½  ð6Þ
Fg is a fixed, gender specific, disutility from working positive hours. The indicator function, 1 n40½ , is equal to 0 when n¼0
and equal to 1 when n40. χg here captures the taste for work while 1=ηg is the Frisch elasticity of labor supply conditional
on employment. Married couples have a joint utility function, UM, with shared consumption, measured in adult equivalents:
UM c;nm;nf
 ¼ log c=e χmn
1þηm
m
1þηm
χf
n
1þηf
f
1þηf
Fm1 nm40½  Ff 1 nf 40½  ð7Þ
4.3. Marriage and divorce
Marriages and divorces occur exogenously in the model. Single households face an age-dependent probability, ωðtÞ, of
marriage whereas married households face an age-dependent probability, πðtÞ, of divorce. We assume that one is always
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Fig. 1. Correlation between hours worked, divorce rates and tax rates for men and women. Note: This figure reports the correlation between hours worked
per year, with divorce and tax rates by gender. There is a strong positive correlation between the divorce rates and hours worked for women. For men it is
positive but close to zero. There is a strong negative correlation between the hours worked and the average effective tax rate for men. The corresponding
correlation for women is also negative but close to zero.
I. Chakraborty et al. / Journal of Monetary Economics 72 (2015) 1–20 9married to someone of the same age and that married couples die together. Except for age, the only form of assortative
mating in the model is by education. There is a higher probability, ω intra_ed:, of marrying someone with the same level of
education. Conditional on age, education and gender, a draw of partner is made from the distribution of singles generated by
the model, Qjgtðj; x; k;uÞ. This means that the agents in the model have rational expectations about their partner's education
level, j, experience, x, asset holdings, k and productivity shock, u.4.4. Government
The government taxes consumption and labor income run a balanced budget. We assume that a fraction ð1ϑÞ of the
government revenues are wasted, i.e. spent on things that are not in the model. The remainder of the government's
revenues is spent on social security payments,Ψg, transfers to unemployed people, T, and lump sum transfers to households,
G. G captures a wide range of government expenditure, from education and healthcare to social aid and disability insurance.
It is beyond the scope of the paper to model these programs in great detail. It is, however, reasonable to assume that these
programs are progressive in the idiosyncratic shock, u. We let GðuÞ ¼ αuðumaxuÞ, where umax is the highest realized value of
u.13 Similar assumptions about the progressivity of G are made by Oh and Reis (2012) and McKay and Reis (2013), who study
government transfer programs in greater detail. Let Υ Sðg; j; k; x;u; tÞ be the measure of single households over gender, g,13 We discretize the process for u using the method developed by Tauchen (1986). αu is adjusted to balance the budget.
I. Chakraborty et al. / Journal of Monetary Economics 72 (2015) 1–2010education, j, assets, k, experience, x, productivity shock, u, and age, t, and ΥMðjm; jf ; k; xm; xf ;um;uf ; tÞ be the measure of
married households. The government budget can thus be written:Z
GdΥ Sþ
Z
ðGmþGf Þ dΥM ¼ϑ
Z
ðnwτSðwnÞþcτcÞ dΥ Sþϑ
Z
ððnmwmþnfwf ÞτMðnmwmþnfwf ÞþcτcÞ dΥM

Z
ðT1 tr44;n ¼ 0½  þΨ g1 t444½ Þ dΥ Sg
Z
ðTð1 tr64;nm ¼ 0½  þ1 tr64;nf ¼ 0½ ÞÞ dΥ
M

Z
ððΨmþΨ f Þ1 t444½ Þ dΥM ð8Þ
Eq. (8) says that the sum of lump sum payments to households is equal to the fraction of tax revenues that is not wasted
minus expenses on social security and transfers to non-working households.
4.5. Household's problem
Let r be the risk-free interest rate and β the time discount factor. τc and τk represent flat taxes on consumption and
capital, whereas τS and τM are nonlinear labor income taxes for singles and married couples, respectively. In most OECD
countries, at least some part of the tax schedule is dependent on whether a person is single or married. There is, however,
significant cross country variation. Written recursively, a single household's problem can be formalized as follows:
VSðg; j; k; x;u; tÞ ¼max
c;n;k0
USðg; c;nÞþβðð1ωðtÞÞEu0 ½VSðg; j; k0; x0;u0; tþ1Þ
þωðtÞEjp ;k0p ;x0p ;u0 ;u0p ½V
Mðj; jp; k0 þk0p; x0; x0p;u0;u0p; tþ1ÞÞ
s:t: : cð1þτcÞþk0 ¼ kð1þrð1τkÞÞþnwðj; g; x;uÞð1τSðwðj; g; x;uÞnÞÞ
þGðuÞþð11 n40½ ÞT
x0 ¼ xþ1 n40½ ; nA ½0;1; k0Z0; c40; ð9Þ
The subscript, p, stands for partner. In the case that an individual becomes married in the next period, the expectation of
next period's utility must be taken with respect to the distribution over potential partners' education, experience, asset
holdings, and idiosyncratic productivity shock, Qjgtðjp; x0p; k0p;upÞ.14 Married couples maximize their joint utility and face an
age-dependent probability, πðtÞ, of becoming divorced. When couples divorce, they split their assets evenly. Their problem
can be written as
VMðjm; jf ; k; xm; xf ;um;uf ; tÞ ¼ max
c;k0 ;nm ;nf
UMðc;nm;nf Þ
þβð1πðtÞÞEu0m ;u0f ½V
Mðjm; jf ; k0; x0m; x0f ;u0m;u0f ; tþ1Þ
þβπðtÞEu0m ½VSðm; k
0=2; x0m;u
0
m; tþ1Þ
þβπðtÞEu0
f
½VSðf ; k0=2; x0f ;u0f ; tþ1Þ
s:t : cð1þτcÞþk0 ¼ kð1þrð1τkÞÞþðnmwmþnfwf Þð1τMðnmwm;nfwf ÞÞ
þGðumÞþGðuf Þþð2ð1 nm40½  þ1 nf 40½ ÞÞT
x0m ¼ xmþ1 nm40½ ; x0f ¼ xf þ1 nf 40½ ; nf ;nmA ½0;1; k
0Z0; c40 ð10Þ
Retired households make no labor supply decisions but receive an amount of social security, Ψg, depending on their gender.
We assume that retirees receive a lump sum redistribution equal to a working individual with a 0 shock. We also assume
that retired households do not marry or get divorced, and that husband and wife die at the same time. Their problem, if
single, is simply:
VSðg; k; tÞ ¼ max
c40;k0Z0
USðg; cÞþΩðtÞβVSðg; k0; tþ1Þ
s:t: : cð1þτcÞ ¼ kð1þrð1τkÞÞþΨ gþGðu¼ 0Þ ð11Þ
where ΩðtÞ is the probability of survival until the next period. Married retirees solve
VMðk; tÞ ¼ max
c40;k0Z0
UMðcÞþΩðtÞβVMðg; k0; tþ1Þ;
s:t: : cð1þτcÞ ¼ kð1þrð1τkÞÞþΨmþΨ f þ2Gðu¼ 0Þ ð12Þ14 Qjgt and Υ S are related as follows. Let the single person i have gender gi, age ti and education level ji. Then:
Qjiqi ti ðj; x; k;uÞ ¼ω intra_edΥ Sðgi ; ji ; k; x;u; tiÞþð1ω intra_edÞΥ Sðgi ;  ji ; k; x;u; tiÞ;
where gi denotes the gender opposite to gi, and  ji denotes the education level different from ji.
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We try to use data from 2000 or the year closest to 2000 that we can obtain. The reason for this is that for the year 2000,
we have data that can be used to construct divorce and marriage probabilities for all the countries in Western Europe. We
also have tax data for all the countries starting in 2001.
5.1. Preferences
The momentary utility functions for single and married persons are given in Eqs. (6) and (7), with consumption measured in
adult equivalents, c=e. We use the OECD adult equivalence scale and set e¼1.7 for married couples, and e¼1.0 for singles.
The discount factor, β, the fixed costs of working, Fm and Ff, as well as χm and χ f are among the estimated parameters. The
corresponding data moments are the mean asset holdings of individuals in households with head aged 20–64, taken from the
PSID (99-05), male and female employment rates from the CPS (2000) and work hours, taken from OECD 2000.
There is considerable debate in the economic literature about the inter-temporal elasticity of labor supply, see Keane
(2011) for a thorough survey. However, there seems to be a consensus that the elasticity of labor supply for women is larger
than that for men. In our model, the inter-temporal elasticity will be related to both the fixed costs of working, Fm and Ff, and
the parameters ηm and ηf . We chose to fix the latter two and calibrate the first two within the model. This ensures that the
model matches both the intensive and extensive margin of labor supply for men and women. Another reason is that η
parameters have direct empirical counterparts in the intensive margin inter-temporal elasticity of labor supply. Kimmel and
Kniesner (1998) separately estimate the intensive margin elasticities, corresponding to 1=ηm and 1=ηf in the model by
controlling for selection and includes a fixed cost of participation. They obtain 0.39 for men and 0.66 for women. We choose
to be slightly more conservative and set 1=ηm ¼ 0:3, 1=ηf ¼ 0:6.15
5.2. Risk free interest rate
Given the partial equilibrium nature of the model, we take the risk free rate as fixed and calibrate it using the data. We
set the risk free rate equal to the average of 3-month t-bill rates minus inflation over the period from 1947 to 2008 based on
data from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
5.3. Wages
We estimate the experience profile of wages and the processes for the idiosyncratic shocks exogenously, using the PSID
from 1968 to 1997. After 1997, it is not possible to get years of actual labor market experience from the PSID. Appendix C
describes the estimation procedure in more detail. We use a maximum likelihood approach to control for selection into the
labor market, as described in Heckman (1976, 1979). We estimate different returns to experience for each gender/education
group. We then obtain the residuals from these estimations and use the panel data structure of the PSID to estimate the
parameters for productivity shock process ρjg and σjg by OLS. Our results for the shock processes are in line with Chang and
Kim (2006) who use a similar approach on PSID data. To get levels of earnings that are in line with the asset holdings, we
include a parameter controlling the average earnings of each gender/education group in the simulated moments estimation.
The corresponding data moments are the average wage of each group in the PSID 99-05.
5.4. Taxes
For single households we use the labor income tax schedule proposed by Benabou (2002) and recently used in Heathcote
et al. (2014). For married couples, we modify the tax function to distinguish between joint and separate taxation of their
income. The tax schedule is then a function of an individual's (or each of the spouses') earnings relative to the average
earnings (AE) (see Eqs. D.1 and D.2 in Appendix D). As described in more detail in the Appendix, we fit this function to labor
income tax data from the OECD tax database (2001). This data is constructed by the OECD based on tax laws from different
countries. It is well suited for cross country comparisons, see also Guvenen et al. (2014). We fit a different tax schedule for
married and single individuals.
Coming up with an accurate estimate of consumption taxes in the U.S. is complicated by the fact that there are local
county-level taxes in addition to state taxes. Vertex Inc. (a consulting company) estimated that the average consumption tax
in the U.S. was 8.4% in 2002. We use that number. We follow Trabandt and Uhlig (2011) and set τk¼36%.
5.5. Death probabilities and social security
We obtain the probability that a retiree will survive to the next period from the National Center for Health Statistics
(1991–2001). We assume that all retirees receive the same constant Social Security benefit, which only depends on gender.15 A calibration where we set the elasticity of labor supply of both genders equal to each other, 1=ηm ¼ 1=ηf ¼ 0:4, yields similar results.
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(2000).
5.6. Marriage and divorce probabilities
To compute the age-specific probabilities for marriage and divorce for the U.S., we use the data from the CPS March
supplement from 1999 to 2001. For most European countries, we use the data from Eurostat on-line database. For some
European countries, we supplement it with the data from the IPUMS International.
We assume a stationary environment, where the probabilities of getting married and divorced do not change over time
(we allow them to depend on the age of the person, but not on his/her cohort). We also assume that the probability of
getting married is the same for those who get married for the first time, and those who were previously divorced. This
allows us to compute the probabilities using the following approach. LetMt and Dt be the share of the married and divorced
persons respectively at age t. Then the probability of getting married at age t, ωðtÞ, and the probability of getting divorced at
age t, πðtÞ, is pinned down by
Mtþ1 ¼ ð1MtÞωðtÞþMtð1πðtÞÞ ð13Þ
Dtþ1 ¼Dtð1ωðtÞÞþMtπðtÞ ð14Þ
We smooth the resulting age-profiles for ωðtÞ and πðtÞ by fitting a polynomial. We find that the probability of getting
divorced is noticeably higher in the U.S. compared to Italy, and somewhat higher compared to Germany. At the same time,
the probability of getting married reaches its peak in the U.S. somewhat earlier compared to the two European countries.16
5.7. Transfers to unemployed, fixed cost of working and lump sum redistribution
People who do not work have other source of income such as unemployment benefits, gifts from relatives and charities,
black market work, etc. They also have more time for home production (not included in the model). Pinning down the
money equivalent value of not working is a difficult task. The number we choose will also affect the size of the fixed cost of
working, which we calibrate endogenously to hit the employment rates for men and women, see Panel B of Table H.13 in the
Appendix. As an approximation for income when not working, we take the average value of non-housing consumption of
households with income less than $5000 per year from the 2000–2001 Consumer Expenditure Survey. As pointed out by Oh
and Reis (2012) transfers to households make up a majority of the government's expenditure. To determine ϑ, the fraction of
the government's income, which can be spent on households in the model, we take the U.S. government budget from 2000
and remove expenditures on defense, interest payments and protection. This leaves us with 76% of the year 2000
government budget. The corresponding average value of G in the model is then $2200. As described in the model section, G
is, however, decreasing in the idiosyncratic shock, G¼ αuðumaxuÞ.17
We also consider an alternative, country-specific calibration of the government transfers, where we use the idea from
Piketty and Saez (2012), and collect the data on: (1) total public spending; (2) social public spending that consists of 5 major
categories – (a) education, (b) health, (c) pensions, (d) income support to working age, (e) other social public spending for all
countries in our sample for the year 2000. We use the data from Adema et al. (2011) and OECD (2011), which we summarize
in the Appendix in Table G.9. We assume that all public spending that does not fall in one of the “social public spending”
subcategories is wasteful from the point of view of the model agents. We assume that “income support to the working age”
and “other social public spending” (which according to Piketty and Saez (2012) include social services to the elderly and the
disabled, family services, housing and other social policy areas) are lump-sum transfers to the poor, while education and
health spending are lump-sum transfers to all agents.18
5.8. Calibration method
The nine parameters which must be calibrated inside the model are found by minimizing the distance between
simulated model moments and data moments. Panel B of Table H.13 in the Appendix summarizes the nine calibrated
parameter values and the data moments. We are able to match all the moments exactly.
5.9. Model fit
It is natural to ask how the model performs along some dimensions, which has not been explicitly targeted. The model
does quite well along a number of dimensions. The standard deviation of log earnings is for instance 0.650 compared to16 The computed probabilities use the data for women. We get a qualitatively similar picture when using the data for both men and women (with the
exception that men in all countries tend to get married somewhat later than women).
17 The value of αu is determined by the level of lumpsum redistribution. In the benchmark model its value is 0.043.
18 Piketty and Saez (2012) argue that education and health care government spending are approximately a transfer of equal value for all individuals in
expectation over a lifetime.
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Fig. 2. Model fit: assets and income over the life-cycle. (a) Assets over the life cycle, (b) male income over the life cycle and (c) female income over life
cycle. Note: The figure plots the life-cycle profiles of asset holdings and earnings by gender in the model and data.
I. Chakraborty et al. / Journal of Monetary Economics 72 (2015) 1–20 130.661 in the data. In Fig. 2, we plot the life-cycle profiles of asset holdings and earnings by gender in the model and data. The
model does quite well in matching the life-cycle profiles of earnings and asset holdings in the data. The reason that average
earnings for women is a bit lower in the model than in the data is that the earnings data is from the PSID, whereas the
model was calibrated using wages from the PSID and hours worked from the CPS (female labor supply is a bit lower in the
CPS). The model cannot replicate the hump shape in work hours over the life-cycle observed in the data.
The simulated Hicksian labor supply elasticity for our model is about 0.41. This is in line with a survey of empirical
studies in Keane (2011), where the average Hicksian elasticity estimate for 22 studies on males is equal to 0.31. Our economy
is, however, also inhabited by women who are known to have more elastic labor supply. The elasticity of female work hours
with respect to the probability of divorce is somewhat smaller than the results in Johnson and Skinner (1986). They estimate
that a 1% increase in divorce probability over a 6-year period leads to a 1.3% increase in female labor supply. The
corresponding number in our model is 0.71%.
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We consider three different counterfactual experiments: (i) we replace both the U.S. marriage and divorce probabilities,
and the tax system in the model with the ones we compute for each European country in our sample; (ii) we replace only
the marriage and divorce probabilities, and leave the tax system unchanged, at the U.S. level; (iii) we replace only the tax
system, and leave the marriage and divorce probabilities unchanged, at their U.S. values.
During these experiments, we keep taxes, old age social security, and income when not working proportional to the
average earnings in the economy.19 In this way, if the society becomes richer or poorer because of a counterfactual
experiment, taxes and social security payments will adjust accordingly.6.1. The effect of marriage stability and taxation
Fig. 3 shows the results when simultaneously replacing both the U.S. marriage and divorce probabilities and the tax
system in the model with those obtained for each European country. On the horizontal axis, we put hours worked in each
country relative to the U.S. (in percent) in the data, while on the vertical axis, we put hours worked relative to the U.S. (also
in percent) in the model.
Ideally, if the model were able to match the hours worked in the European countries exactly, using just the two
mechanisms that we study in this paper, all the observations would fall on the diagonal line (the black line). If the
observation for a particular European country falls to the left of the diagonal line in the picture, it means that the two
mechanisms that we study do not lead to enough reduction of hours worked in that country compared to the U.S. to match
the data perfectly (agents “work too much” in the model compared to the data), and vice versa if the observation falls to the
right of the diagonal. Hours worked in the U.S. fall on the diagonal line by construction, since our model is calibrated to
match the U.S. in terms of annual hours worked.
Fig. 3 shows that we obtain a positive correlation between the hours worked generated by the model and hours worked
that we find in the data, equal to 0.327. We explain 45% of the variation between the U.S. and the European countries in the
data as measured by the coefficient of determination:
R2 ¼ 1SSerr
SStot
ð15Þ
where SSerr ¼
Pn
i ¼ 1 ðhi;modelhi;dataÞ2, SStot ¼
Pn
i ¼ 1 ðhi;datahusÞ2, hi;model is the hours worked in country i generated by the
model, hi;data is the hours worked in country i in the data, and hus is the hours worked in the U.S. (both in the model and in
the data).20 This means that the two mechanisms that we study work in the right direction. However, since all our European
countries but Denmark fall to the left of the diagonal, this means that the two mechanisms that we study generally do not
reduce the hours worked in the model enough to match the data perfectly.
Column (3) of Table 4 lists the results for each country in the model, as percent of hours worked in the U.S., next to the
observed value in the data in Column (2). As can be seen from the table, we are relatively more successful in explaining
hours worked in the Nordic countries and Central Europe than in Southern Europe.
Panels (b) and (c) of Fig. 3 illustrate the impact of one mechanism at a time – we either change the U.S. marriage and
divorce probabilities in the model to those found in the European countries while keeping the tax system unchanged (i.e.,
set to the U.S. level), or change the U.S. tax system while keeping the marriage and divorce probabilities unchanged. In both
cases, we get positive correlations between the hours worked generated in the model and those that we find in the data –
higher taxes and higher marriage stability reduce hours worked in the model. The correlations with the data in both
separate experiments are of about equal strength, and smaller than those from the combined experiment, suggesting that
both mechanisms play an important role in accounting for the difference in hours worked between the U.S. and Europe
(which is similar to what we found in Section 3). As measured by R2, divorce and marriage probabilities explain 17% of the
variation in labor supply between the U.S. and the European countries, whereas taxes explain 32%.
As can be seen from Columns (4) and (5) in Table 4, taxes generally work in the wrong direction for the Southern European
countries, which have low taxes, and hours increase relative to the United States. However, Southern European countries have
very low divorce rates, which work in the right direction for these countries. In the Nordic countries divorce and marriage
probabilities work in the wrong direction. These countries have very low marriage rates and also high divorce rates. Taxes,
however, do a good job of predicting labor supply in the Nordic countries. In Central Europe both the divorce and tax
mechanisms reduce hours relative to the U.S.
Table 5 shows the results from the alternative, country-specific calibration of the government transfers. In this alternative
calibration, when we replace both the marriage and divorce probabilities and the tax system from the European countries, we
explain 47.5% of the variation in hours worked between the U.S. and the European countries, as measured by R2.19 In the case of taxes, we have specified them as polynomials in y=AE, where y is individual labor income, and AE is the average earnings in the economy.
20 In the literature our R2 is also referred to as the “forecast skill” measure. It evaluates by how much the model in question improves the forecast
compared to some reference model. In our case, the hours worked in the U.S. are used as the “reference model”.
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Fig. 3. Combined and separate effect of marriage stability and taxes. (a) Combined effect of marriage stability and taxes, (b) effect of marriage stability, (c)
effect of taxes. Note: This figure reports the results when simultaneously replacing both the U.S. marriage and divorce probabilities and the tax system in
the model with those obtained for each European country. The horizontal axis represents hours worked in each country relative to the U.S. (in percent) in
the data. The vertical axis represents hours worked relative to the U.S. (in percent) in the model.
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Table 4
Hours worked in the model and in the data, in percent of the U.S. hours.
All Men Women
Data Tax. & Div. Divorces Taxes Data Tax. & Div. Divorces Taxes Data Tax. & Div. Divorces Taxes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
Nordic countries:
Denmark 83.5 74.4 100.5 73.9 82.3 70.9 100.5 70.3 86.9 79.7 100.6 79.1
Finland 85.5 94.4 102.4 92.9 81.3 87.3 100.6 86.4 90.6 104.6 105.0 102.2
Norway 80.6 92.2 100.1 92.3 81.7 87.1 99.9 87.3 77.7 99.7 100.5 99.7
Sweden 87.4 90.9 104.8 88.3 83.7 85.5 102.7 84.1 91.9 98.7 107.9 94.2
Mean: 84.3 88.0 102.0 86.8 82.3 82.7 100.9 82.0 86.8 95.7 103.5 93.8
Central Europe:
Austria 79.4 96.4 101.1 95.4 84.6 92.0 100.9 91.2 71.8 102.8 101.5 101.6
Belgium 68.4 78.0 96.3 80.4 73.9 73.8 97.8 75.6 60.5 84.0 94.3 87.3
Netherlands 73.5 94.1 97.6 95.8 85.4 89.6 98.4 90.8 55.5 100.8 96.6 102.9
Germany 67.9 82.1 97.0 83.8 71.3 86.2 98.0 87.3 62.1 76.2 95.5 78.8
Switzerland 91.3 98.7 98.6 100.0 101.3 99.3 99.1 100.1 79.4 97.9 97.8 99.8
France 72.4 94.8 99.4 94.8 75.0 94.0 99.2 94.2 68.8 96.0 99.8 95.8
Luxembourg 75.9 93.8 96.3 97.2 85.1 95.5 98.0 96.9 61.4 91.5 93.8 97.5
UK 87.3 101.3 98.7 102.4 94.5 97.5 98.9 98.5 77.9 106.9 98.3 108.1
Mean: 77.0 92.4 98.1 93.7 83.9 91.0 98.8 91.8 67.2 94.5 97.2 96.5
Southern Europe:
Greece 86.5 99.6 92.9 104.8 97.3 96.0 95.9 100.2 71.6 104.9 88.6 111.5
Ireland 82.9 96.4 98.1 97.9 93.0 96.3 98.5 97.8 67.2 96.4 97.5 98.1
Italy 72.0 94.1 93.1 98.7 82.3 89.6 95.8 93.2 57.3 100.7 89.1 106.8
Portugal 87.3 96.8 94.6 101.2 88.9 97.7 97.0 100.3 84.9 95.4 91.0 102.6
Spain 72.0 104.2 95.6 107.2 99.8 99.7 97.2 102.3 57.4 110.8 93.5 114.4
Mean: 80.1 98.2 94.9 102.0 92.3 95.9 96.9 98.8 67.7 101.7 91.9 106.7
U.S.A. 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
R2 0.452 0.170 0.321 0.757 0.090 0.708 0.098 0.217 0.066
Corr (data,
model)
0.327 0.326 0.239 0.671 0.219 0.680 0.040 0.614 0.140
Note: This table displays hours worked as % of U.S. hours in the data and in the model, after introducing taxes and divorce and marriage rates from other
countries. Column (2) reports data and Column (3) reports the results whenwe simultaneously replace both the U.S. marriage and divorce probabilities and
the tax system in the calibrated model with those obtained for each European country. Columns (4) and (5) respectively report results when we replace
only the marriage and divorce probabilities, and leave the tax system unchanged, at the U.S. level; and when we replace only the tax system, and leave the
marriage and divorce probabilities unchanged, at their U.S. values. Columns (6)–(13) repeat the exercise by gender. Overall the model explains 45% of the
variation in labor supply between the U.S. and the European countries, as measured by R2.
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Fig. 4 and Columns (6)–(13) of Table 4 present the results. The figure shows that there is a very pronounced difference in
how these two mechanisms affect men and women in our model. Female labor supply is mostly correlated with the
marriage stability mechanism. Female hours worked fall in countries with more stable marriages. At the same time, in the
model where we only change the tax system, leaving the marriage and divorce probabilities at their U.S. levels, the
correlation between the actual hours worked by women in the data and those generated by our model is small and negative.
As measured by R2, divorce and marriage probabilities explain 22% of the variation in female labor supply between the U.S.
and the European countries, while taxes do not help to explain the differences in hours worked in our model.
The results for men are directly opposite to those for women. In our model, men appear to react mostly to the changes in
the tax system. When we change the marriage and divorce probabilities and leave the taxes at their U.S. levels, the
correlation between the actual hours worked by men in the data and those generated by our model is small and negative.
This is in line with our findings in Section 2 that there is no correlation between male labor supply and divorce rates in the
data. The R2 for men is 9% when we introduce European marriage and divorce probabilities and 71% when we introduce
European tax systems into the model. We conclude that taxes are a very powerful explanation for male labor supply, while
divorce and marriage rates help significantly in explaining female labor supply.6.3. The impact of tax progressivity and separate taxation on male and female labor supply
Why do the higher European taxes affect men much more than women in our model? The effect is related to the
structure of the tax systems. The European countries with high average labor income taxes are also more likely to have
higher tax progressivity (the correlation between the average effective labor income tax rate and the tax progressivity
measure that we used in Section 3 is for instance 0.389 is our sample), meaning that the higher tax rates in these countries
Table 5
Hours worked in the model and in the data, in percent of the U.S. Hours: alternative calibration of government transfers.
All Men Women
Data Model Data Model Data Model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Nordic countries:
Denmark 83.5 75.1 82.3 71.7 86.9 80.1
Finland 85.5 94.0 81.3 86.9 90.6 104.4
Norway 80.6 90.1 81.7 84.9 77.7 97.6
Sweden 87.4 89.8 83.7 84.6 91.9 97.5
Mean: 87.3 82.0 94.9 84.2 82.2 86.8
Southern Europe:
Greece 86.5 101.8 97.3 98.2 71.6 107.0
Ireland 82.9 96.7 93.0 96.6 67.2 97.0
Italy 72.0 94.4 82.3 89.9 57.3 100.8
Portugal 87.3 96.6 88.9 97.5 84.9 95.2
Spain 72.0 102.7 99.8 98.2 57.4 109.3
Mean: 98.4 96.1 101.9 80.1 92.3 67.7
Central Europe:
Austria 79.4 96.1 84.6 91.9 71.8 102.2
Belgium 68.4 78.3 73.9 74.4 60.5 83.9
Netherlands 73.5 95.6 85.4 91.2 55.5 102.1
Germany 67.9 80.6 71.3 83.9 62.1 75.9
Switzerland 91.3 97.2 101.3 97.8 79.4 96.2
France 72.4 93.5 75.0 92.5 68.8 94.8
Luxembourg 75.9 94.2 85.1 96.2 61.4 91.1
UK 87.3 99.3 94.5 95.4 77.9 104.9
Mean: 91.8 90.4 93.9 77.0 83.9 67.2
U.S.A. 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
R2 0.475 0.784 0.115
Corr (data,model) 0.326 0.697 0.011
Note: This table displays hours worked as % of U.S. hours in the data and in the model with alternative calibration of government transfers, after
introducing taxes and divorce and marriage rates from other countries. Column (2) reports data and Column (3) reports the results when we
simultaneously replace both the U.S. marriage and divorce probabilities and the tax system in the calibrated model with those obtained for each European
country. Columns (4)–(7) repeat the exercise by gender. Overall the model explains 48% of the variation in labor supply between the U.S. and the European
countries, as measured by R2, which is similar that from the main calibration.
I. Chakraborty et al. / Journal of Monetary Economics 72 (2015) 1–20 17will disproportionately affect high earners. It is even possible that because of the tax progressivity, low earners face lower
tax rates in Europe compared to the U.S. Another important feature of tax systems is joint vs. separate taxation. Guner et al.
(2012) point out how separate taxation of married couples encourages female labor supply through lowering the tax rate on
the secondary earner in a married couple (usually the female).21 Because of the gender wage gap, men are more likely to be
among the high earners. Because countries with high average tax rates typically also have very progressive taxes and
practice separate taxation of married couples, men bear most of the burden from the higher European tax rates.
To study the impact of tax structure vs. tax level, we conduct the following experiment. We start with our benchmark model,
which we calibrated using the U.S. labor income taxes. Then we first change the labor income taxes so that the average labor
income tax rate would be equal to that in Norway, but tax progressivity would remain the same as in the U.S.22 The degree to which
couples are taxed jointly is also kept like in the U.S. in this experiment. Next, we change to a Norwegian tax system. We choose
Norway because it is both among the countries in our sample for which the impact of the tax change on labor supply was much
larger for men than for women. Norway has a highly progressive tax system and practices separate taxation of married couples.
Fig. 5 shows what happens to hours worked for men and women at different wage-quintiles as we change the tax system. The
results confirm our intuition. As we change the U.S. taxes to the Norwegian tax level, keeping tax progressivity unchanged, the
work hours schedule shifts downward – individuals at all wage-quintiles reduce their labor supply. As we change to a Norwegian
tax system, the work hours schedule also changes its shape – because of the higher tax progressivity and separate taxation of
married couples, the lowest earners actually increase their work hours, while higher earners reduce their work hours further.
6.4. Intensive vs. extensive margin
In Section 2 we documented that the intensive and extensive margins are about equally important in accounting for
differences in labor supply between the U.S. and Europe but that the importance of the two margins varies greatly with region.21 Figure H.7 in the Appendix shows negative correlation between s1 (our measure of joint taxation of married couples) and hours worked by
married women.
22 See Appendix F for the details.
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Fig. 4. Effects of marriage stability and taxes by gender. Note: This figure compares by gender, hours worked as percentage of U.S. hours in the data and in
the model, after introducing taxes and divorce and marriage rates from other countries. The horizontal axis represents hours worked in each country
relative to the U.S. (in percent) in the data. The vertical axis represents hours worked relative to the U.S. (in percent) in the model.
I. Chakraborty et al. / Journal of Monetary Economics 72 (2015) 1–2018Table H.12 in the Appendix displays our model's performance in accounting for the intensive and extensive margin of labor
supply across countries. We find that divorce and marriage probabilities explain 33% of the variation in employment rates
between the U.S. and our European countries and do not help to explain the variation in the intensive margin. However, for taxes
it is the other way around. Taxes explain 47% of the variation in intensive margin hours between the U.S. and the European
countries but do not help in explaining the variation in the employment rates. This is similar to what we find in the data.236.5. Discussion
The correlation between female labor supply in the data and in our model when we introduce European divorce and
marriage rates is quite strong, 0.61. However as measured by R2 we only explain 22% of the variation in female labor supply
between the U.S. and our European countries. The effect of marriage and divorce rates pull in the right direction but the size of
the effects is not that large.
A concern may be whether divorces are costly enough in the model. More costly divorces are likely to increase the impact of
marriage and divorce probabilities on labor supply. For instance, we do not have children in the model. Children usually follow23 In unreported regressions, we find that when extensive and intensive margin labor supply is regressed on divorce rates and tax measures, taxes only
help explain the variation in intensive margin labor supply and divorce rates only help explain the variation in extensive margin labor supply.
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I. Chakraborty et al. / Journal of Monetary Economics 72 (2015) 1–20 19their mother in the case of divorce, making divorce more costly for women (See Fernández and Wong, 2013 for a model that
incorporates this effect). Cubeddu and Rios-Rull (2003) assume that 20% of a couple's assets are lost when there is a divorce. This
may be a reasonable assumption. Divorces carry large administrative costs, potential losses related to liquidation of home equity,
reduced labor market mobility if there are children in the marriage, etc. We leave alternative specifications of the cost of divorce
for future research but believe that the real cost of divorce is larger than in the current model.7. Conclusion
In this paper we show that prime aged women are the largest contributor to differences in aggregate labor supply between
the U.S. and Europe. We document a negative cross-country correlation between tax levels and labor supply and a positive
correlation between divorce rates and labor supply across countries. However, the former correlation is driven by a strong
correlation between male labor supply and taxes, whereas the latter correlation is driven by a strong correlation between female
labor supply and divorce rates.
To quantify the impact of differences in tax schemes and divorce/marriage rates on labor supply, we develop a life-cycle,
overlapping-generations model with heterogeneous agents, marriage, and divorce. We calibrate our model to U.S. data and
study how labor supply in the U.S. changes as we introduce European tax systems, and as we replace the U.S. divorce and
marriage rates with their European equivalents. Combining these two mechanisms can account for 45% of the variation in
hours worked between the U.S. and the European countries. Taxes are a good predictor of male labor supply but do not help
explaining the variation in female labor supply. Divorce and marriage rates can explain some of the variation in female labor
supply across countries but is a worse predictor of male labor supply.Acknowledgments
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